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CASE NOTES
IS A LEGAL REMEDY, AVAILABLE ONLY IN A FOREIGN JURISDIC-
TION, AN ADAQUATE REMEDY WHICH WILL EXCLUDE EQUITY
JURISDICTION ?-The case of Beach et al. v. Beach Hotel Corpora-
tion1 answered this question in the negative. In that case, the
plaintiff, Beach, had owned a parcel of land in the city of Bridge-
port on which he desired to build a hotel. The Development
Service Corporation agreed to erect and finance it for him. Pur-
suant to this agreement, the Beach Hotel Corporation was organ-
ized as a Connecticut corporation, and the Development Service
Corporation contracted with the Wark Company, a Pennsylvania
corporation, to have the latter build the hotel. The contract
with the Wark Company also provided that as soon as the con-
tract between the Wark Company and the defendant hotel
corporation should be executed, the Wark Company would sub-
scribe to 1750 shares of preferred and a like amount of shares
of common stock in the defendant hotel corporation, and that
the first payment of 10% on the subscription should be paid
then. The payment was made. The balance of the subscription
price was to be called and paid as the construction progressed.
No calls were in fact made for this balance. The contract also
provided that the development company would maintain a sales
organization to sell the stock of the defendant and that the first
stock to be sold should be the stock subscribed to by the Wark
Company and the payments received should be applied against
the subscription of the Wark Company. The development com-
pany sold about 731 shares each of common and preferred stock
of the defendant and turned over the proceeds to the defendant.
A first mortgage was made on the property to help finance the
project.
The Wark Company was not paid in full on the contract and
filed a mechanic's lien against the building. In ttie meantime
plaintiff and the defendant became insolvent. The mortgage was
foreclosed and the Wark Company realized nothing from its
lien.
A receiver was appointed for the defendant hotel corporation,
and the Wark Company filed its mechanic's lien claim against
the receiver. The receiver then filed a cross complaint against
the Wark Company for the balance due on the latter's subscrip-
tion to the defendant corporation's stock. The motion of the
Wark Company to strike the cross complaint on the ground that
the receiver had an adequate remedy at law on the subscription
was overruled by the lower court and the ruling was affirmed by
the supreme court, which court said in part: "A failure to give
the receiver a remedy in the present equity action would force
him to resort to the courts of a foreign jurisdiction for relief.
1 117 Conn. 445, 168 A. 785 (1933).
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A remedy at law, to exclude equity jurisdiction, must be as com-
plete and beneficial as the relief in equity. 'Adequate remedy at
law means a remedy vested in the complainant, to which he may
at all times resort, at his option, fully and freely, without let or
hindrance.' No legal remedy can be considered as adequate which
the plaintiff must go into a foreign jurisdiction to avail himself
of. It. must be a remedy in our own courts."
The court cited as precedent for its holding the case of
Stanton v. Embry,2 which was a bill in equity to restrain the
enforcement of a judgment obtained in the courts of the District
of Columbia. The respondent's intestate had performed profes-
sional services in prosecuting a claim for the petitioners against
the United States. The claim was collected, and the intestate
sued the petitioner for his fee in a court of the District of Colum-
bia and recovered. The respondent then brought an action of
debt on the judgment in a Connecticut court. Suit was then
brought to restrain the collection of more than $2296.25 of the
judgment on the ground that said judgment was obtained by
fraud and mistake. The respondent demurred on the ground
that the petitioners had an adequate remedy at law in the Dis-
trict of Columbia to correct the judgment. The demurrer was
overruled, the court saying: "It is claimed by counsel for the
respondent that this right to go into the court which rendered
the judgment and ask for a new trial, a remedy which it is
claimed is open to the petitioners under the laws of the District
of Columbia, is an adequate legal remedy, and that this court
can not assume equitable jurisdiction over the matter while the
petitioners have this remedy. But no legal remedy can be con-
sidered adequate which a party is compelled to go into a foreign
jurisdiction to avail himself of. It must be a remedy which our
own courts can apply."
The Federal courts have consistently followed this rule and
have held that an adequate remedy in the state courts not avail-
able in the Federal court will not oust Federal equity jurisdic-
tion.3 In the case of Borden's Condensed Milk Company v.
246 Conn. 595 (1879). Reversed on other grounds.
3 National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 F. 593 (1903); Cable v. United
States Life Ins. Co., 24 S. Ct. 74, 191 U. S. 288, 48 L. Ed. 188 (1903);
Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 37 L. Ed. 853 (1893)
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Osborne, 44 S. Ct. 431, 265 U. S. 14, 68 L. Ed. 878
(1924); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Eveland 285 F. 425 (1922) ; St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 F. 123 (1918) ; Cleveland Cliffs Iron
Co. v. Village of Kinney, 262 F. 980 (1919) ; Franklin v. Nevada-California
Power Co., 264 F. 643 (1920) ; Clarkson Coal Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers,
23 F. (2d) 208 (1927) ; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, 23 F. (2d) 109 (1928) ; Wrigley Pharmaceutical Co. v. Cameron, 16 F.
(2d) 290 (1926); Standard Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 13 F. (2d)
633 (1926); Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton et al, 235 F. 317
(1916); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad & W. Comm. et al., 280 F. 387
(1922); Hill City Ry. Co. v. Youngquist, 32 F. (2d) 819 (1929).
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Brker,4 the complainant, a New Jersey corporation, was exten-
sively engaged in producing, distributing, and selling milk and
milk products. It supplied the town of Montclair with milk.
Under a general New Jersey statute, the local health board
passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk other than that
from cows inspected by a state official and found healthy and
free from tuberculosis or other disease. The complainant brought
suit to enjoin the enforcement of this ordinance on the ground
that its business would be ruined and that the act was uncon-
stitutional in that it provided for the taking of property with-
out due process of law. The defense to the bill was that the
complainant had an adequate remedy at law in the state court
by a writ of certiorari. The court held that a legal remedy in the
state courts is no defense to equitable jurisdiction in the Federal
courts. The legal remedy to be adequate must be available in
the Federal courts. The chancery jurisdiction of a Federal court
is similar in extent to the jurisdiction that belonged to the Eng-
lish Chancery in 1789. "Among the cases in which the Chancery
exercised jurisdiction were certain controversies for which no
adequate remedy existed in the English courts of law. The
Chancery did not inquire whether the complainant could obtain
redress in a foreign court, but whether an English court of law
could fully deal with the situation. So a Federal court of
equity, following the chancery precedents, does not inquire about
the remedies available in a state court (which for this purpose
is a foreign tribunal), but whether a Federal court of law offers
an adequate remedy; and this inquiry is confined to the remedies
in the Federal courts, no matter how ancient may be the reme-
dies offered by the state. Congress may, of course, change the
Federal remedies from time to time; the change may be made by
original legislation, or by adopting the remedies of the state; but
the test is always whether the remedy under examination is avail-
able in the Federal courts. If it is not, its existence does not
affect the equitable jurisdiction of the Circuit Court."
In another Federal court case, Risty v. Chicago Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Company,5 the complainants tried to enjoin
the assessment of costs of certain repairs of land drainage works
against the complainant's property on the ground that the whole
proceedings were invalid. In answer to the defense of adequate
remedy in the state courts of South Dakota, the court said:
"The remedy by appeal to the state court under section 8469
does not appear to be coextensive with the relief which equity
may give. In any event, it is not one which may be availed of
at law in the Federal courts, and the test of equity jurisdiction
in a Federal court is the inadequacy of the remedy on the law
4 177 F. 906 (1910).
5 270 U. S. 378, 46 S. Ct. 236, 70 L. Ed. 641 (1926).
CASE NOTES
side of that court and not the inadequacy of the remedies af-
forded by the state courts."
In a recent case in the Federal courts, Miller v. Union Assur.
Soc., Ltd. of London, England,6 the complainant insurance com-
pany had issued policies of fire insurance on the defendant's
home. The policies contained the usual mortgage clause and also
a provision avoiding the policy if the hazard were increased by
the keeping of gasoline or other explosives on the premises. A
loss by fire occurred, and the complainant paid the loss to the
mortgagee, whose mortgage was larger than the loss paid. The
complainant then brought suit to be subrogated to the rights of
the mortgagee and to foreclose the mortgage, on the ground that
the policy was avoided as to the mortgagor because he had used
or allowed the use of a still on the premises and had kept gaso-
line and alcohol there. This subrogation was provided for
in the policy. The defendant's contention that the complainant
had an adequate remedy at law in the state courts was held un-
availing because "The remedy at law to be adequate must be a
remedy at law in the Federal court where jurisdiction in equity
is sought."
There are three old cases in the state courts that hold con-
trary to the foregoing cases. They are Tone v. Brace,7 Murray v.
Toland,8 and Birdsail v. Fisher.9 In Tone v. Brace, the defend-
ant had been the owner of a New York farm which was subject
to a mortgage. He had leased it to the complainant for a term
of five years. In the third year while the complainant still had his
crops in the ground, the mortgage was foreclosed and the prop-
erty sold. The complainant was evicted and lost his crop. He
had not paid the rent for that year. The defendant in the mean-
time had moved to Michigan. Afterwards the defendant com-
menced a suit in New York against the complainant for the rent.
The complainant sued to enjoin the proceedings at law on the
ground that he, the complainant, had suffered a greater loss than
the amount of rent and that defendant was insolvent. In the
answer, the defendant denied liability and insolvency and con-
tended that the complainant had an adequate remedy at law.
The court dismissed the bill on the latter contention and held
that the remedy at law was no less adequate merely because the
complainant had to go into another state to avail himself of it.
The court said: "In Murray v. Toland, one of my predecessors
in this court refused to interfere, although the defendant against
whom the set off was claimed by the complainant resided in
Spain. And if the fact that the party was out of the United
639 F. (2d) 25 (1930).
7 8 Paige (N. Y.) 596 (1841).
8 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. (N. Y.) 569 (1818).
9 17 Minn. 76 (1871).
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States was not a sufficient ground for the interference of this
court in that case, the residence of Brace in one of our sister
states was not alone sufficient to sustain the injunction, upon this
bill and answer."
The decision in Murray v. Toland, on which the judge relied,
was based largely on other grounds, and the holding there on
the question here considered was not necessary for the decision
there. The facts were that the defendant and one Meade, a resi-
dent of Spain, owned some tin in about equal proportions. The
tin was shipped to the defendant in New York on account of the
owners. The defendant sent the invoice to the complainants to
sell the goods for him. The complainants sold the goods and then
notified the defendant that they would retain the proceeds in
part satisfaction of a separate claim of one of the complainants
against Meade. The defendant brought an action at law for the
proceeds and the complainants brought suit to stay the action
at law. The court dismissed the bill, thus disallowing the set-off,
on the grounds that in an action between the factor and buyer,
it was no defense that the buyer had a separate claim against
the principal; that the evidence showed that the claim against
Meade had been satisfied; and that it was a claim on a tort,
which was unliquidated and therefore not capable of set-off.
The court dismissed the contention of the complainant-that he
might have difficulty in obtaining satisfaction from Meade who
resided in Spain if the money here were not applied against the
claim-saying: "The inconvenience of following a party to his
place of residence abroad, does not appear to me to be, of itself,
a sufficient ground for departing from the settled doctrine of
the court." This ruling was not necessary to a decision of the
case.
The third case holding that a legal remedy in a foreign court
will oust equity jurisdiction is the case of Birdsal v. Fisher.10
It is a suit on a promissory note made jointly by the defendants.
In the answer the defendant Fisher claimed that the plaintiffs
were indebted to him upon another contract and prayed that
the contract claim might be set-off in payment, pro tanto, of the
note. He asked the set-off as an equity, because he had no avail-
able legal remedy in this state against the plaintiffs, who were
non-residents, had no property here, and could not be served
here. Was this such an equity that a separate bill could have
been brought for it ? If so, it could be set-off in this action under
the practice act of this state, Minnesota. The court disallowed
the set-off on the grounds that a separate debt could not be set-
off against a joint debt and that Fisher did not show that he had
not an adequate remedy at law. "There is no allegation of
plaintiffs' insolvency, and no reason to suppose that Fisher may
10 17 Minn. 76 (1871).
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not have a remedy at law in the courts of the state of New York,
where he alleges that plaintiffs reside. And to constitute an ade-
quate remedy at law, it is not necessary that such remedy should
be attainable within the jurisdiction where the defendant re-
sides, or where suit is brought against him." The judge here
cited Murray v. Toland and Tone v. Brace.
Thus, of these three cases, denying equity jurisdiction where
there is an adequate remedy at law in a foreign jurisdiction, two
rely altogether on the third, and the other, Murrnj v. Toland, in
passing on this question, made a ruling not necessary for the
decision of the case. Therefore, the three cases are a weak au-
thority on this question.
Aside from those in the Federal courts, there are not many
decisions that pass on the point of this review. Yet the doctrine
that a legal remedy to be adequate must be available in the same
jurisdiction was recognized as far back as Lord Hardwicke's
time, who in the case of Shish v. Foster," in 1747, mentions,
without citing, the case of Jacobson v. Hans Towns (or Mer-
chants of Almaign) wherein, he says, the lessor brought an action
of ejeetment against Jacobson, the lessee. The lessee had no de-
fense to the ejectment but brought a bill in equity to stay the
ejectment until he, the lessee, could get satisfaction against the
lessor on another claim. The relief was granted, "Not that he
had any real lien on the estate; but from the difficulty of his
getting satisfaction if his estate was taken from him, as they were
a corporation residing beyond the sea."
From the cases herein reviewed, by the weight of authority, a
legal remedy available to the plaintiff only in a foreign jurisdic-
tion is not an adequate remedy which will exclude equity juris-
diction in the forum.12 Such a doctrine is sound-how can a
remedy be as certain, clear, complete, prompt and efficient as the
remedy in equity if the complainant is forced to go into a for-
eign jurisdiction to obtain it!
J. BOUCEK
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH AFTER SEVEN YEARS' ABSENCE AS
FULFILLING THE CONDITION OF DEATH IN LIFE INSURANCE POL-
icY.-Where the insured has been absent and unheard from for
more than seven years under such circumstances that his death
cannot be inferred, will the insurance company be liable in a
11 1 Ves. Sr. 88, 27 Eng. Rep. 909.
12 Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schaff, 5 F. (2d) 610 (1925); City Ry. Co.
v. Beard, 283 F. 313 (1922); Schwab v. City of St. Louis, 310 Mo. 116, 274
S. W. 1058 (1925) ; J. P. Duffy Co. v. Todebush, 173 App. Div. 205, 159 N.Y.S.
299 (1916); Pearson v. Richards, 106 Or. 78, 211 P. 167 (1922); Blackstone
Hall Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 39 R. I. 69, 97 A. 484 (1916);
Jones v. Stearns, 97 Vt. 37, 122 A. 116 (1923); People v. Bordeaux, 242 Ill.
327, 89 N. E. 971 (1909) ; Sumner v. Staton, 151 N. C. 198, 65 S. E. 902 (1909).
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suit brought on a life insurance policy? This question arose in
Wilson v. Prudential Insurance Company of America.1 Wilson,
a man of thirty-eight years of age, left his wife and his home
town of Pownal, Maine, and departed with another woman. At
Lynn, Massachusetts, he sold his mortgaged car. Later, the de-
serted wife received a letter from the other woman from Los
Angeles, saying she had not seen the husband since leaving Lynn,
but that he had said he was going to Canada. The wife investi-
gated, but without success, and, after seven years, brought suit
on the policies insuring Wilson's life. The court held that no
presumption arose-the leaving was explained.
In most jurisdictions in this country the common law rule, or
a statute declaratory of and embodying the principle stated by
such rule is in effect. Those states having such a statute have
liberally construed it, so that it may be considered on the same
basis as the common law rule. The rule is said to be that a pre-
sumption of death arises from an unexplained absence of seven
years if reasonable efforts to learn the person's whereabouts are
made.2 The presumption of death from unexplained absence is
not, however, a presumption of law, but a mixed p-esumption of
law and fact, which may be rebutted, and it will not be indulged
when the circumstances of the case are such as to account for the
absence of the person without assuming his death. 3
To this latter rule there are many exceptions. Two hypothet-
ical cases at opposite ends of the rule -will help to illustrate. A
man has committed a crime and leaves his home physically well,
and is never again heard from. A man with no troubles, a good
home, loving wife and family, and a satisfactory income sud-
denly disappears and is never again heard from.
In the first hypothetical case the best written opinions recog-
nize that not only is the presumption of death from seven years'
unexplained absence rebuttable, but also in certain cases suffi-
cient evidence is not adduced to cause the presumption to arise.
That seems to be the view of the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Nebraska, where it was held that where
a man who commits a heinous crime flees in full vigor of health
and is not heard from, the presumption of life's ceasing within
seven years is absent, and, on the contrary there is an inference
of life after that period.4 Now, by that expression is not meant
that under those circumstances the presumption of death is re-
butted, but rather that sufficient facts and circumstances have
not been adduced even to raise the presumption. By a reference
1 166 A. 57 (Me., 1933).
2 Thetford v. Modern Woodmen of America, 273 S. W. 666 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1925) ; 17 C. J. 1167; 8 R. C. L. 708.
317 C. J. 1167.
4 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 71 F. 258 (1895).
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to the common law rule we note the word "unexplained," which
is always included in the rule. Bouvier states the rule to be:
"Persons who have been once shown to have been in life are
always presumed thus to continue, until the contrary is shown;
• * . But proof of long continued absence unheard from and un-
explained will lay a foundation for a presumption of death. "5
In the hypothetical question first referred to, the crime was
committed by a man, who was healthy when he disappeared. In
this case we see that there are two facts which are adverse to
allowing a presumption of death to arise. First, the fact that a
crime was committed explains the initial departure, as the man
is a fugitive from justice. Second, the fact that he was in good
health makes a situation harmonious only with a presumption
of life. So, on principle, where a man disappears for good cause,
in good health, no presumption of death in any length of time
should arise from these bare facts.
In a well written opinion, Circuit Judge Hickenlooper, in the
case of Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v.
Sieg,6 concurs in the foregoing principle. The facts in that case
are briefly that the assured was short in his accounts with his
employer in a large sum of money; when he left hurriedly, he
was in good health, except for a little ear trouble, and was not
seen or heard from in seven years. These facts, as will be seen,
are squarely in point with the hypothetical case. Judge ilicken-
looper thus states the law: "In the present case the presump-
tion is that of death of the insured. It is created or arises only
when unexplained absence of seven years, without tidings, has
been 'established.' This fact may be taken as established where
it is conceded by the defendant, where no reasonable juror could
conclude otherwise, or where the evidence offered by the plaintiff
to sustain the contention is credited by the jury; but, clearly, the
burden of proving such fundamental facts remains always with
the party in whose favor the presumption operates. If substan-
tial evidence be offered tending to rebut the facts upon which
the presumption is founded, the issue 'is at large on the proofs,'
and if the party in whose favor the presumption is claimed does
not sustain the burden of proof resting upon him, to prove these
facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption is not
overcome or rebutted-it simply has never been created." Hence
plaintiff had the burden of proving all elements to sustain the
presumption, and as the reason for leaving was apparent, some
other facts were needed to offset this, or no presumption arose.
Similar is the case of Petition of Talbot,7 where a married man,
who after nineteen years of married life, not all blissful, but
5Law Dictionary (8th ed.), p. 776.
653 F. (2d) 318 (1931).
7 250 Mass. 517, 146 N. E. 1 (1925).
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with no open breach, left with another woman, and gave his wife
a power of attorney, all his property including a good business,
with the exception of some ready cash, saying he was going to
start anew. The court stated that here no circumstances were
shown to raise a presumption of death, but plenty of evidence
to further the presumption of life.
Again in Thetford v. Modern Woodmen of America,8 we have
a case where an explained disappearance barred recovery. Thet-
ford, a young man of twenty-one years of age and in excellent
health, was indicted for forgery and disappeared. Some evidence
was adduced to show that a private in the army had recognized
him because of a slight limp, but this was not considered as con-
trolling. The presumption of death under these facts was
rejected.
The foregoing cases have been examples of explained absences.
In the case of unexplained absence for seven years, the courts
have almost without exception held a presumption of death to
arise. But the evidence of unexplained absence is not always
as conclusive as that in our second hypothetical case.
In Policemen's Benevolent Association of Chicago v. Ryce,9
a policeman, one of five hundred, was discharged for political
reasons, and the evidence shows that he had previously been dis-
charged and rehired. He disappeared in good health and without
any apparent reason. He had relatives in four parts of Chicago,
in Wisconsin and in Ireland. Inquiry was directed by these rela-
tives everywhere without result, and after seven years of ab-
sence he was presumed dead, and his heirs recovered. Here one
might say his discharge made him despondent, and hence he
might have committed suicide, but his previous discharge, his
good health and spirits combine to overcome this possibility.
Another Illinois case10 is still stronger. Kennedy, a farmer
living in Tuscola, Illinois, happily married and the father of six
children, left his home to go to Champaign to pay the rent on
the farm. He had two hundred dollars with him for that purpose.
He was never again heard from, although the defense offered
evidence that he was seen in Salt Lake City, but such evidence
was sufficiently rebutted by evidence showing the lack of repu-
tation for truth and veracity of the person claiming to have seen
him in the West. The case went to the jury, who allowed a
recovery.
In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Gatz,11 Gatz
and his wife, residents of Kentucky, bought a saloon in Indian-
apolis, Indiana, where they moved. Shortly afterward, while
8 273 S. W. 666 (Tex. Civ. App., 1925).
9 213 El. 9 (1904).
10 Kennedy v. Modern Woodmen of America, 243 Il1. 560 (1910).
11 188 Ky. 218, 206 S. W. 299 (1918).
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things were going satisfactorily, Gatz said to a friend, "Good-
bye, Studor, you will never see me any more." Studor went and
told the wife of the occurrence within an hour, and although the
police and others searched everywhere, no trace of him was ever
discovered. The wife removed to Kentucky and after seven years
brought a successful action against the insurance company. The
absence here was unexplained, yet possibly Gatz intended to
desert or feared death or foul play, but in the eyes of the law
the absence was sufficiently unexplained to raise a presumption
of death where there was no evidence rebutting these facts.
The case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Fry12
states even less facts to support a presumption. Fry, soon after
being married and while he was apparently happy, at twenty-one
years of age, disappeared while out selling insurance. His father
investigated thoroughly, but no trace of him was found. The
premiums were kept up on the policy and after five years (the
common law period was changed by statute) the father recov-
ered. The wife, meanwhile, had divorced the lad on grounds of
desertion.
In Ledger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company,13
the plaintiff was the wife of a man who left his home in Detroit
by bus to go to Cincinnati on business, and after arriving there
wrote a postcard as follows: "Dear Mary: I will not be home
until Saturday morning. I am getting two more machines to sell.
Regard to all. Jos." No further trace of him was found, yet his
relatives, his wife and the insurance company searched diligently.
Two years after the disappearance, the wife secured a divorce
on the grounds of cruelty, and the defendant sought to set this
up as an estoppel, but the court held that it only went to the
credibility of her testimony, and where this was supported by
her son, whom the jury believed, it was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of death under the circumstances.
In the last five cases mentioned, the absence in each was un-
explained; in some it might have been suicide, in others acci-
dental death or desertion, but nothing was shown by way of
motive or otherwise to prove directly circumstances from which
death could be immediately inferred. These cases all fall within
the general common law rule, and in each, sufficient was shown
to sustain an unexplained absence without tidings for seven
years.
It may now be said that if a person is absent from his home
for seven years, without tidings, and the absence is unexplained,
he can be presumed to be dead, but that if a plausible reason
for his disappearance is presented, the presumption of death
either will not arise or will be sufficiently rebutted. The state-
12 184 Ark. 23, 41 S. W. (2d) 766 (1931).
13 258 Mich. 26, 241 N. W. 803 (1932).
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ment appears satisfactory enough, but cases may be found where
a sufficient explanation can be given for a disappearance, and
yet a recovery is allowed.
In the case of Donovan, Adm. v. Major,1 4 the court allowed
recovery for a novel reason. A fifteen year old boy left home
because he was dissatisfied, and wanted to go west. Hence, there
is an explanation for his disappearance. He and his brother
were both heirs of their grandfather, and they both were aware
of the fact, because the grandfather bought them clothes, sent
them to school, and had told them that whatever he left they
were to divide, provided they were twenty-one years of age at
the time. After the grandfather's death, suit by the brother was
instituted for the disappeared boy's share. The court said that
as the boy's death could only be established after seven years,
he would then be over twenty-one, and so would get his share,
but held that the presumption of death arose, because the lad
had knowledge that he was the heir of a rather ample estate, and
if alive would have returned to claim it.
A similar case from the standpoint of facts, yet decided for a
different reason, is that of Ma4ey v. The Pennsylvania Railroad
Company.15 Here a father made provision for the division of a
savings account among his three children when he should die.
His two sons left home within three years of each other and be-
fore their father's death. Their destination was unknown except
that the elder son had expressed an intention to go west. Their
departure from the small Pennsylvania town was probably known
to every one in the town. After the father's death, the daughter
claimed the entire fund. Neither of the boys had been heard
from since his departure. In the case of the elder that was
twenty years. A recovery was allowed and the presumption of
death indulged in. The fact that the absence was explained in
its origin was apparently considered unimportant in view of thie
long absence without tidings, and the uncertainty of their where-
abouts overcame the necessity for making search or inquiry.
Even where more cogent reasons than voluntary desire to
leave are shown to explain the absence, a few cases indulge in
the presumption of death. Illustrative is the case of Konieczny
v. J. Kresse Company.1 This is a workmen's compensation case,
where a woman claims compensation for her husband's death.
The insurance company's defense was that she was not his wife
as she had previously been married and never divorced. She
replied that such was the case, but that her first husband had
been absent for over seven years without tidings. The proof
showed that the man was an habitual drunkard, abused his wife,
14253 Ill. 179 (1911).
15 258 Pa. 73, 101 A. 911 (1917).
16256 N. Y. S. 275 (1932).
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was constantly in trouble, was arrested numerous times for
breaches of the peace, and would not work, that he deserted his
wife (this is the explanation of his departure) and had never
again been heard from. These facts might be sufficient to rebut
a presumption of death, but because the husband did not even
see or write to his own blood relatives, who also could not find
him, the court held he was to be presumed dead. The court ap-
parently considers that a reason for deserting a wife would not
be an equally good explanation of an absence without news from
his own blood kin. Although we might not be willing to approve
the case on this ground, the result was undoubtedly correct and
the court might have based its decision on the rule that the pre-
sumption of the validity of a ceremonial marriage is stronger
than the presumption of the continuation of life.
17
Probably the largest group of cases where the presumption
of death is accepted although the absence be explained is that
where tidings are abruptly terminated. The leading case of this
group is Whiting v. Nicholl.x8 The husband left New York in
1842 in disgrace as a trust company defaulter. He carried on
a continuous correspondence with his wife for ten years, and
during that time had risked his liberty in seeing her three times.
On March 21, 1852, she received the last letter from him. From
that he did not appear discouraged nor morose, but stated that
he was working at hard labor, near Pittstown, Pennsylvania. The
wife tried to trace him, but never after saw nor heard from him.
The court held that after seven years from the last letter he was
presumed dead. This is undoubtedly sound law, as the receiv-
ing of the last letter began an unexplained absence equivalent
to that under the general rule.
In Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Martin,19 the
Whiting case is followed. James Tate, father of the plaintiff was
fifty-seven years of age, and treasurer of the State of Kentucky.
He had embezzled state funds and left the state a fugitive from
justice in March, 1888, and his wife had received letters from
him from China, Japan, and later from the State of Washing-
ton, until December, 1888, when the last letter was received. All
his letters had been optimistic and affectionate, and in his last
letter he stated he had a very bad cold. The court held that the
presumption of death was a jury question, that the facts were
such that it could be implied. The jury found for the plaintiff,
but the case was reversed on other grounds.
The case of Goodier v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York,2 0 illustrates cases where a recovery is allowed because
17 See Johnson v. Johnson, 114 Il. 611 (1885).
18 46 Il1. 230 (1867).
'9 108 Ky. 11, 55 S. W. 694 (1900).
20 158 Minn. 1, 196 N. W. 662 (1924).
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of the physical condition of the disappeared at the time of the
disappearance. An attorney of Utica, New York, had an affec-
tionate and devoted wife and three children; he was highly re-
spected in the community, but became financially involved. He
had used his client's trust funds for his own purposes and this
was about to be discovered. He was sent to a sanitarium for his
health, having suffered from heart and intestinal troubles, and
disappeared from the sanitarium. Here the court held that the
physical condition of the man made the presumption of death
arise in seven years, despite the fact that he left because of his
peculations. This doctrine is also followed in Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States v. James,21 and Axen
v. Missouri State Life Insurance Company.
22
An Iowa case28 embodies all three reasons for the presumption
as given in the foregoing cases. The recovery in this case can
be placed on the theory of letters received and correspondence
terminated, or on the theory that the man's physical condition at
the time of his disappearance was not such as to justify long
life, or on the theory that he would continue to write his mother,
his own flesh and blood, if alive. Rodskier, the insured, was very
happily married and had two children, he was forty-two years
of age and had been married eight years. He was the cashier of
a bank and was short in his accounts about ten thousand dollars.
He admitted his peculations in a letter written the bank from
New Orleans, La., in which he said he lost the money in specu-
lation. His wife received the last letter from him on February
14, 1921, and his mother living abroad received a letter also
about the same time, stating that he was going to South America,
and would write when he arrived there. His health was bad at
the time of his departure and just previous thereto he had lost
twenty-five pounds in weight. Great effort was exerted to learn
of his whereabouts, but it was unavailable. After seven years
recovery from the insurance company was allowed. The court
stated, "The rule is that a continued and unexplained absence of
a person for seven years, notwithstanding efforts of relatives to
locate him, creates a jury question on the issue of death even
though the original disappearance occurred when the insured
was a defaulter to a large amount. The presumption of death
from the unexplained absence for over seven years may, of course,
be rebutted, and the fact of his being a defaulter may be consid-
ered as rebutting evidence." This case most clearly shows that
facts and circumstances of an individual case may warrant a
recovery even though the person who disappears was a defaulter,
21 73 Ind. App. 187, 127 N. E. 11 (1920).
22203 Iowa 555, 213 N. W. 247 (1927).
23 Rodskier v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wis., 216
Iowa 121, 248 N. W. 295 (1933).
CASE NOTES
when friendly but despondent letters received by the family soon
after his departure are followed by seven years without tidings,
especially where the man was ill at the time of his departure.
The general rule is stated that life is presumed to end at the
end of seven years, but there is a long line of cases, known as
peril cases, which modify this rule. The modification is made on
the theory that the presumption of death is a negative one; that
at the end of seven years he is not alive, and at some time during
the period he died. 24 Under the rule of the peril cases, a per-
son who goes down with the ship is presumed dead at the time
the ship was last seen or would have reached port if still afloat.
In United States v. Hayman,25 the assured was subjected to
epilepsy when he disappeared, and, in an action on a life insur-
ance policy ten years later, this was held sufficient from which
to presume death on the day of the disappearance.
In Brownlee v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Associa-
tion,26 two men went mountain climbing, and one returned after
going through violent storms. It was shown that if a person
fell down a crevasse he could never be found dead or alive. The
presumption of death arises at once. In State Life Insurance
Company v. Sullivan,2 7 a man suffering from hallucinations,
whom the doctors said would live about six months, got out of
custody and was seen going down to the bay. It was here held
that sufficient peril was shown to make the presumption arise
on the first day of his disappearance. The rule of the peril cases
is simply that if the peril is in fact great enough death can be
presumed on the first day of the disappearance.
The conclusion to be drawn is that each case must of neces-
sity be decided upon its own facts. If the disappearance is ex-
plained, it must be decided in each case whether there are suffi-
cient facts to sustain the presumption of death despite the strong
rebutting force of the explanation. It must be remembered that
despite the fact of the explanation, if, in fact, seven years' ab-
sence without tidings is shown and due inquiry is made, the case
will be a jury question, and recovery generally will be had if any
fact or circumstance can be shown from which the probability
of death may be inferred. In the principal case, therefore, the
court was justifiecT in saying that since the absence was explained
in its inception, and since no evidence was given which could
be said to give rise to the inference of death, the presumption
was rather one of continuation of life than one of death.
R. A. IsAcs
24 Simon Creenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (16th ed.), I, 138.
2562 F. (2d) 118 (1932).
2629 F. (2d) 71 (1928).
2758 F. (2d) 741 (1932).
